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Dissecting Bioethics
“Dissecting Bioethics,” edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry,
welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimen-
sions of bioethics.
The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by
bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people’s
actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the
many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a
moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-
evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated.
The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, natu-
ralness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of
reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.
All submitted papers are peer reviewed. To submit a paper or to
discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala at tuija.takala@helsinki.fi.
Dignity: Two Riddles and Four Concepts
DORIS SCHROEDER
Two Dignity Riddles
I M A G I N E a dignified death . . .
your own. Where are you? Who is
with you? Do you fall asleep without
waking up? If you live in a Western,
industrialized society, your thoughts
may quickly turn to a particular type
of death. For instance, the vision of
yourself lying in bed with a debilitat-
ing illness, unable to eat by yourself,
unable to wash yourself or go to the
bathroom, incontinent or connected to
urinary tubes, tended by strangers in
a hospital, potentially demented, puz-
zled, lonely, unable to comprehend
where you are and in serious pain.
Observations of lonely, painful, in-
stitutionalized dying and the fear
thereof have sparked Death with Dig-
nity movements around the world,1
organizations created to show “cour-
age and compassion in an area of deep
concern to us all —the making of wise
and deliberate choices at the end of
life,“2 in other words, the choice to die
from one’s own or a physician’s hand.
For many, death with dignity means
dying without excruciating pain, with-
out relatives having to witness the ach-
ing disintegration of their loved ones,
and without the embarrassment of
needing help for the most basic human
functions. To achieve their aims of le-
galizing physician-assisted suicide or
euthanasia, Death with Dignity orga-
nizations appeal almost exclusively to
the concept of dignity, as the names of
organizations throughout the world tes-
tify.3 But, surprisingly, so do their op-
ponents, as the following three quotes
show:
[T]o kill an innocent human life,
whether one’s own or another’s, even
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for the sake of avoiding terrible suf-
fering, is intrinsically immoral. Eutha-
nasia and suicide are contrary to the
intrinsic dignity of human persons.4
This sense of the . . . dignity of all
human life has been influential in
maintaining traditional western pro-
hibitions against abortion, suicide, eu-
thanasia, and hazardous medical
experimentation on human subjects.5
We want our deaths to be free from
pain, mess, embarrassment. But there
is a long Christian tradition of “holy
death,” that is, of allowing even a
hard death to be a witness to God’s
grace. We’re nowhere invited to ring
down the curtain early to preserve
our pride. How dignified did Jesus
look on the way to the cross? Spat-
tered with blood and spit, despised
and rejected, he carried his own in-
strument of torture up a hill. Was this
a death with dignity? Ironically, it was.6
Dignity forbids suicide or euthana-
sia according to the above three au-
thors, whereas it demands suicide or
euthanasia according to Death with
Dignity organizations. This is our first
dignity riddle. Two opposing groups7
discussing the same topic both using
the concept of dignity to support their
positions! How can this be possible?
I M A G I N E a dignified per-
son. . . . Whom do you see? Perhaps
Nelson Mandela, who kept his poise
and self-respect during 26 years of
imprisonment? Or Nobel Peace Laure-
ate Aung San Suu Kyi, who spent 11
of the past 18 years in some form of
detention in Burma without losing her
serenity? Or Antigone, daughter of
Oedipus, who combined heroic cour-
age with gentle care for her father and
brother? Whatever you see, it is un-
likely to be a mass murderer, a tor-
turer, a rapist, or a pedophile. In
general, one associates dignity with
certain character dispositions that pre-
vent evil behavior. For instance, ratio-
nal self-control, composure, calmness,
but also the power of self-assertion
and belief in one’s own worth. Dig-
nity is a quality that generates respect
and even awe among those who ob-
serve it.8 Yet, if dignity is restricted to
persons who generate awe in observ-
ers, how can one explain its appear-
ance in numerous national constitutions
and many ethical guidelines? “Human
dignity is inviolable” starts the Ger-
man constitution, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights bases
freedom, justice, and peace on “the
recognition of the inherent dignity . . .
of all members of the human family.”
If all human beings have inherent dig-
nity, the same would apply to tor-
turers and rapists, and there is no
difference — in this respect — between
Mother Theresa and Adolf Hitler. So
why, when asked to imagine persons
with dignity, do we name specific peo-
ple for whom we feel awe? Why do we
only think of some people when asked
about dignity? Doesn’t this imply that
one can either lose or never possess it?
This is our second dignity riddle.
Is Dignity a Useless Concept?
Ruth Macklin contended that “dignity
is a useless concept.” 9 Franz Josef Wetz
agreed and expressed more flourish-
ingly that “dignity is an entry from
the old-European grand vocabulary,
which not unlike drugs tricks the ad-
dict into believing in fantastic fake
solutions for deep conflicts.” 10 Helga
Kuhse argued that “the notion of
human dignity plays a very dubious
role in contemporary bioethical dis-
course. . . . [It] has a tendency to stifle
argument and debate and encourages
the drawing of moral boundaries in
the wrong places.” 11 Macklin’s, Wetz’s,
and Kuhse’s modern voices echo older
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warnings by Arthur Schopenhauer
(1788–1860), for whom dignity was
going to develop into the shibboleth12
of all thoughtless philosophers, a word
for an idea that cannot be thought,
such as the highest number or the
largest space.13
The above authors suggest that dig-
nity is to be purged from ethical dis-
course. And, indeed, if the concept is
so vague that it can be used to de-
fend opposing positions, so it should.
However, all four address their con-
cerns to the Kantian concept only,
without distinguishing it from others.
By introducing four different con-
cepts and by shedding light on the
two posed dignity riddles, I intend to
show that there is hope for dignity
yet. As Matti Häyry put it, if nobody
monopolizes the term, the recogni-
tion that dignity is multifaceted can
lead to constructive dialogue between
people and cultures.14
Four Concepts of Dignity
Kantian Dignity
The most prominent Western under-
standing of dignity goes back to Im-
manuel Kant (1724–1804), who believed
he could prove the existence of a su-
preme law of morality15 and its link to
human dignity. Due to the complexity
of his thought, Kant is one of the most
difficult philosophers to abridge. Still,
in order to understand Kantian dignity,
the main elements of his ethical theory
need to be outlined very briefly. Kant
started his explorations into ethics from
moral common sense, which he saw cap-
tured in the following sentence:
It is impossible to think of anything at
all in the world, or indeed even be-
yond it, that could be considered good
without limitation except a good will.16
Based on this observation, Kant infers
that morality is intimately linked with
duty. How does he make this infer-
ence? For Kant, God is the only being
who can only act morally. Animals, on
the other hand, cannot act morally at
all. Human beings belong to neither
category as they can act morally and
immorally. Based on his premise that
only a good will is intrinsically good,
Kant states that the concept of “duty”
is included in the concept of the “good
will.” The good will needs to be di-
rected at something and this can only
be the moral good. It would not be a
good will if it were directed at any-
thing else. Hence, to distinguish one-
self from animals one has to strive for
the moral good, that is, one has a duty
to be moral.
The ability to separate good and
bad depends on the human faculty of
reason. Only because human beings
are rational is it possible for them to
decide between morally right and
wrong. And now comes Kant’s move
to human dignity! Every individual
rational being is an end in itself, some-
body with life plans. Such a being
should not be bought by others like
commercial goods and used for their
own purposes. Human beings have
intrinsic worth, not a price for which
they can be acquired.17 They have ab-
solute inner worth (absoluten innern
Wert18 ). Or as Kant scholars often put
it, human beings have dignity because
of their “rational nature in its capacity
to be morally self-legislative.” 19
The term that has been coined for this
type of dignity is gift or dowry dignity,20
dignity one has intrinsically, without
ever being able to lose it.21 Kant al-
ludes to this point when he says, “I can-
not deny all respect even to a vicious
man.” 22 What does it mean if some-
body has dignity in the Kantian sense?
According to Kant, a person with dig-
nity has rights, “an absolute inner worth
by which he extorts (abnötigen) respect
for himself from all other rational be-
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ings in the world.” 23 Thus right hold-
ers must not be instrumentalized by
other human beings without their rea-
sonable consent or, in Kant’s own words,
act in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other,
never simply as a means, but always
at the same time as an end.24
This statement of Kant’s is also
known as the Formula of Humani-
ty.25 Based on the above, Kantian dig-
nity could be defined as follows:
“Dignity is a property of all rational
beings,26 which gives the possessor
the right never to be treated simply
as a means, but always at the same
time as an end.” However, inter-
national laws and national constitu-
tions have stressed the inviolability
of human dignity and expanded its
scope to include all human beings.
The modern Kantian-inspired defini-
tion of dignity would therefore be
Dignity is an inviolable property of all
human beings, which gives the pos-
sessor the right never to be treated
simply as a means, but always at the
same time as an end.
Aristocratic Dignity
The Latin term dignitas links directly
to ornament, distinction, or glory.27
When one talked about dignity in pre-
modern times, one referred to strati-
fied societies where some people were
valued higher than others. The Ger-
man word Würdenträger [carrier of dig-
nity] is a clear indication of such
traditions. Carriers of dignity were in-
vested with secular or religious posi-
tions of high rank, and they behaved
in a dignified way when they acted in
accordance with this position. Often it
was assumed that God invested carri-
ers of dignity with their rank or that it
was handed down through noble fam-
ilies. Kings, popes, or other nobles
would be regarded as dignified if their
conduct befitted those of higher rank.28
Thus, dignity was restricted to an in-
finitesimally small number of human
beings and strongly associated with a
position. A suitable term for this type of
dignity would be aristocratic dignity.29
And one could define it as follows:
Dignity is the outwardly displayed
quality of a human being who acts in
accordance with her superior rank and
position.
Comportment Dignity
Aristocratic dignity links dignity to
outward displays of actions. If some-
body wears a heavy silk gown, carries
a sceptre, and walks in front of a large
number of state officials with an up-
right posture at slow pace, we can
assume that he has a position of supe-
rior rank. Yet, by describing a king
who walks in front of his members of
court, I just combined two elements of
dignity, which can be separated: the
dignity when acting in accordance with
superior rank and position and the
dignity of appropriate and seemly com-
portment. Let us look at two literature
quotes to illustrate the point.
Her gloves were not merely well-
worn but battered, Rasumichin no-
ticed, and yet this evident poverty
gave the ladies an air of dignity, which
can be found in people who know
how to wear shabby clothes. Razumi-
hin looked reverently at Dunetschka
. . . . “The queen who mended her
stockings in prison,” he thought qui-
etly, “must have looked like a queen
and even more royal than at sumptu-
ous banquets and receptions!” (Fjodor
Dostojewski, Crime and Punishment,30
emphasis added)
The two ladies Dostojewski de-
scribes cannot claim superior rank or
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position; otherwise they would not be
so poor. Dostojewski wrote Crime and
Punishment five decades before the rule
of the Tsars ended. Under this regime,
those of noble birth or in superior
state positions would not have worn
battered gloves. Yet, Dostojewski com-
pares one of the ladies with a queen in
prison, somebody who has queenly
comportment despite being forced by
circumstances beyond her control to
mend her own stockings. This exam-
ple gives us the outward display of
aristocratic dignity, namely noble com-
portment, but in two ladies who con-
temporaries in Russia would have
called of inferior social rank.
Certain outward signs of dignified
behavior are expected in most soci-
eties from most human beings. Let us
look at a second literature quote.
He had not slept a wink. . . . His lips
curled in an involuntary sneer as he
looked around the train carriage and
saw how many of the passengers were
already . . . either dozing, or napping,
or nodding off, or snoozing, or snatch-
ing forty winks, their mouths hanging
stupidly open, their heads lolling, their
eyelids drooping heavily. Did these
people have no sense of dignity, no
self-respect? (Jonathan Coe: The House
of Sleep,31 emphasis added)
Societies have myriad rules about
dignified comportment, and the pro-
tagonist in Coe’s novel strongly be-
lieves that sleeping in public with one’s
mouth open and head lolling violates
one of them. In the same way as Coe’s
protagonist believes it is undignified
to snooze on a train, it could appear
undignified to tell a rude joke at an
official dinner with one’s mouth full,
to giggle at an obituary, to kiss one’s
partner in a Catholic church (unless
he is the groom), to spit onto the street,
to undress or relieve oneself in public,
and so forth. This type of dignity, which
we could name comportment dignity,
can be defined as follows:
Dignity is the outwardly displayed qual-
ity of a human being who acts in accor-
dance with society’s expectations of
well-mannered demeanor and bearing.
Meritorious Dignity
Aristotle did not mention dignity in
the Nichomachean Ethics. Yet two attri-
butions32 to Aristotle are often quoted.
• Dignity does not consist in pos-
sessing honors, but in deserving
them.
• The ideal man bears the accidents
of life with dignity . . . making
the best of circumstances.
In the first quote, Aristotle contrasts
two perceptions of possible dignity.
First, one is dignified if one possesses
honors. Second, one is dignified if one
deserves to possess those honors. The
quote indicates that one can appear to
have dignity (if one possesses honors)
without deserving it. The mere appear-
ance of dignity through the posses-
sions of honors is reminiscent of the
aristocratic view on dignity. As noted
previously, the Latin term dignitas links
directly to ornament, distinction, or
glory. Ornament in particular refers to
something that can be displayed with-
out the equivalent merit or desert. This
is not dignity for Aristotle. Dignity
consists in deserving not displaying hon-
ors, in other words, being honorable.
Honorable is, of course, another word
for being morally praiseworthy, prin-
cipled, respectable, upright, admirable
as my thesaurus assures me. Hence,
dignity is linked to the cardinal vir-
tues for Aristotle. To be morally praise-
worthy, principled, and admirable
means to have a reliable character dis-
position toward courage, justice, wis-
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dom, and temperance, given Aristotle’s
belief in the unity of the virtues.33
Does the second quote point us in a
similar direction? “The ideal man bears
the accidents of life with dignity . . .
making the best of circumstances.”
What the ideal man (or woman) is
bearing are not happy accidents of
life, but those involving pain and suf-
fering; otherwise they would not have
to be borne. This quote therefore points
toward a quality that human beings
need when their life is difficult, when
circumstances cause anguish, distress,
and hurt rather than joy and warmth
and peacefulness. Which qualities
would you wish your friends had when
they suddenly encountered a serious
misfortune? Would these not be the
cardinal virtues as well as a sense of
self-worth? It most definitely cannot
be outer ornaments and honors; nei-
ther can it be intrinsic worth that ev-
erybody possesses, because Aristotle
spoke of the “ideal” man and not of
“every” man. To cope with life’s acci-
dents, one needs inner strength, not
outer recognition. For instance, a friend
of my parents just died in a hospital
very suddenly and unexpectedly at
the age of 60. In Germany, with a
female life expectancy of 82, this is
regarded as too young to die, and it is
therefore considered a serious misfor-
tune. What would I wish the grieving
husband? I would wish that he can
bear this misfortune with courage, the
courage necessary to get through seri-
ous pain and suffering. I would wish
that he has temperance and patience
and does not make it his life’s pur-
pose to try to find desperately some-
body whom he could blame. I would
also wish that he has the wisdom to
see that all life ends and that this end
is beyond our control. I would wish
him a sense of self-worth, so that he
does not think his life ends with his
wife’s. And I would wish him a sense
of justice in his dealings with children
and grandchildren. They deserve his
support. All the cardinal virtues as
well as a sense of self-worth are re-
quired to bear the accidents of life,
and Aristotle uses one word to cover
them, namely dignity. One could argu-
ably contend that dignity is a virtue
(a reliable character disposition34 ). In
fact, it is not an individual virtue, but
a keynote to the cardinal virtues. Those
who possess temperance, courage,
and justice and are guided by wisdom
display dignity in its most perfect
instantiation.35
Based on these considerations, mer-
itorious dignity could be defined as
follows:
Dignity is a virtue, which subsumes
the four cardinal virtues and one’s
sense of self-worth.
Dignity Riddles Tackled
Let us return to the first dignity riddle
(defendingopposingviewsonphysician-
assisted suicide with the same con-
cept). Death with Dignity organizations
advocate the option of an accelerated
death for competent adults who are “suf-
fering unbearably from incurable ill-
ness.” 36 Acceleration of death aims at
mercifully releasing a person from hav-
ing to go through the final stages of a
terminal illness. A death with dignity is
equated with a death in peace and with-
out suffering.37 If one sees peace as a
state of harmony, the following three sce-
narios38 seem to militate most strongly
against a peaceful death in the health-
care setting.39 In 2002, Diane Pretty died
in the United Kingdom from motor neu-
ron disease. She had unsuccessfully cam-
paigned for her right to assisted suicide,
as she feared the choking and asphyxia
in the final stage of her disease. Accord-
ing to her husband, “Diane had to go
through the one thing she had foreseen
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and was most afraid of —and there
was nothing I could do to help.” 40 In
1995, a prison inmate in Washington,
D.C., was left in soiled bedding for
10 days, unable to walk to the lava-
tory, incontinent, and dying from AIDS.
Because of the stench in his cell, no
medical staff would treat him. He fi-
nally died tied to a wheelchair with a
urine-stained sheet.41 Peter Allmark re-
calls a terminal lung cancer patient
who was frequently in such severe
pain that he screamed in his U.K. hos-
pital where pain control was badly
managed and morphine only given in
inadequate amounts and at low fre-
quencies.42 According to these three
examples, extreme anxiety, deep em-
barrassment, and unbearable pain mil-
itate against a peaceful death in the
medical setting. And it is those scenar-
ios that lead to fears about loss of
dignity.43
A group of eminent philosophers
(Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick, Rawls, Scan-
lon, and Jarvis Thomson) joined Death
with Dignity organizations in their ad-
vocacy work and published the follow-
ing plea in the New York Times Book
Review: “Most of us see death . . . as
the final act of life’s drama, and we
want that last act to reflect our own
convictions, those we have tried to
live by, not the convictions of others
forced on us in our most vulnerable
moment.” 44
Equipped with our four definitions
of dignity, we can say about the first
riddle that unbearable pain, embarrass-
ment, and anxiety have no relevance for
Kantian-inspired, inviolable dignity.
Such intrinsic dignity cannot be lost and
is not available in degrees. Those under
extreme pain, embarrassment, and anx-
iety have no less or no more dignity than
the more fortunate. This is why the
Christian authors cited above use the
concept of dignity to oppose physician-
assisted suicide. The purposeful accel-
eration of death of an intrinsically
valuable being is contrary to this being’s
intrinsic dignity and must therefore be
prevented. By contrast, Death with Dig-
nity organizations and the above phi-
losophers seem to align dignity with
effort and values that one has lived by
in the past. They, therefore, appeal to
the meritorious and the comportment
concept of dignity. What one might have
tried all one’s life, to fit into society’s
standards of decent behavior, one might
not be able to achieve in death. And to
have this witnessed by others on whom
one is dependent leads to one’s percep-
tion of lost comportment dignity. At the
same time, unbearable pain and ex-
treme anxiety may undermine the car-
dinal virtue of wisdom and thereby the
associated cardinal virtues of courage,
justice, and temperance. Even though
the most virtuous may achieve dignity
in death despite substantial torments
(one of the Christian authors above cites
Jesus’ death as an example), Death with
Dignity organizations implicitly main-
tain that nobody should have to. If one
does not want to die from foreseeable
asphyxia in the final stages of a termi-
nal disease, one’s meritorious dignity
should not be thus tested. Those groups
who contributed to our first riddle there-
fore use highly different concepts when
they appeal to dignity and specifica-
tion of concepts is important in resolv-
ing the riddle.
Of course, advocates of physician-
assisted suicide such as the above cited
philosophers focus mostly on the re-
spect of autonomy in dying patients.
However, if dignity and respect for
autonomy were equated, Ruth Mack-
lin would be right. Dignity would be
superfluous and could be eliminated
from bioethical discourse. However, I
hope to have shown in the above short
discussion that dignity is more than
respect for autonomy and that an analy-
sis of dignity concepts has the poten-
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tial to illuminate debates as long as
one does not expect dignity to have
only one, clearly delineated meaning.
In the same way as light can be
shed on the first dignity riddle by
taking the different meanings of dig-
nity into account, so can the second
dignity riddle be moved toward reso-
lution. People like Nelson Mandela and
Aung San Suu Kyi show dignified de-
fiance in their fight for human rights.
Dignified defiance is mostly fueled by
dignity as a virtue, a strong sense of
self-worth, courage, wisdom, temper-
ance, and justice. Yet, it also has an
element of comportment dignity, as
shown in defiant posture and poise.
When asked who shows great dignity,
human beings tend to look for dignity
as a virtue with the required comport-
ment and not as an intrinsic quality of
human beings, which can never be
lost (the view expressed by most leg-
islative instruments).
I would not maintain that dignity
has necessarily been delineated exhaus-
tively in my four different definitions.
Neither would I argue that deep-
seated moral dilemmas can easily be
resolved by an appeal to any particu-
lar notion of dignity. However, as Derek
Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword45
have rightly noted, dignity is a slip-
pery idea, but it is also a very power-
ful one and the demand to purge it
from ethical discourse amounts to whis-
tling in the wind. It is better to try and
eliminate some of its slipperiness than
to ignore its supremacy in everyday
morality46 and national and inter-
national law.
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